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[261] 
Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom 
of Corporate Information 
ROY PELED* 
The global financial crisis illustrated that the enormous power amassed by 
large corporations can have devastating effect on almost every individual 
around the globe in case of a wave of massive corporate failures.  Forty-six 
years ago, demands for oversight over government operations and the desire 
for citizens to become more engaged in the democratic process had helped 
ushered in the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).  This article argues for 
extending a similar general duty of disclosure requirement to corporations 
because they hold pertinent information required for democratic participation. 
This article examines the justifications for FOIA and their applicability to 
corporate information.  It reviews existing mechanisms in the U.S. and other 
countries, that allow for access to some corporate information, and discusses 
how they fall short of meeting the needs of an open and democratic society.  
After considering possible arguments against the notion of freedom of 
corporate information, it reaches the conclusion that, subject to certain 
limitations, it is a much needed legal reform that can contribute significantly to 
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It should be as much the aim of those who seek for social 
betterment to rid the business world of crimes of cunning as to rid the 
entire body politic of crimes of violence . . . The first requisite is 
knowledge, full and complete; knowledge which may be made public 
to the world.  Theodore Roosevelt (1901) 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Occupy Protests during the summer 2012, from Zuccoti 
Park, New York, to Town Square, Anchorage, and from the 
Rothschild Boulevard in Tel-Aviv, to St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, 
taught us that socioeconomic priorities might be changing; that we 
must reexamine the major institutions that lead our society and our 
legal thinking about them.  This article suggests the adoption of a 
fundamental change in how we currently view corporate 
accountability and specifically corporations’ right to conceal 
information.  Such a change requires parting with deeply rooted 
perceptions of corporate rights and corporations’ role in society.  In 
the following pages, I will advocate a policy change that would 
recognize a general right to receive information from corporations, 
subject to narrowly construed exceptions. 
Nearly 250 years have passed since the enactment of the world’s 
first freedom of information (“FOI”) law in the Swedish monarchy.1  
Its central function was to restrict the power of the king, while 
granting power to the press.  Since then, more than ninety countries 
have instituted FOI laws, and such laws constitute important tools in 
restricting governmental powers, especially a government’s abilities 
to curtail civil rights.2  Fittingly, enacting FOI laws was one of the first 
legislative measures post-communist countries in Eastern Europe 
undertook once released from the yoke of the Soviet Union.3  In the 
 
 1. For an English translation of the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 1766, considered 
to be the world’s first FOI law, see His Majesty’s Gracious Ordinance Relating to Freedom of 
Writing and of the Press § 6 (1766) (Peter Hogg’s trans.), in Richard E. Freeman, Andrew C. 
Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited,” 15 
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 364, 368 (2004). 
 2. “Freedom of information” is the term accepted internationally to describe the right of 
the public to receive information from administrative entities.  The term is vague, and some 
prefer to use “the right to know,” or “right of access to information” to express the same idea.  
This article uses these terms to communicate the same idea. 
 3. For discussions on FOI legislation in Eastern Europe, see John M. Ackerman & Irma E. 
Sandovel-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 85, 103, 122 (2006); Article 19, The Global Campaign for Free Expression, Promoting 
Practical Access To Democracy: A Survey of Freedom of Information in Central and Eastern 
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more veteran democracies, FOI has become a central tool to 
empower citizens’ dealings with their government by redistribution 
the control of information.  
Based on their financial position, several private commercial 
corporations are as powerful as the governments of many United 
Nation member states.4  Corporations nowadays control information 
often similar in significance and magnitude to those in the hands of 
governments.5  If information is indeed power, then these 
corporations may control as much power as many governments.  Yet 
these corporations are subject to dramatically less scrutiny than 
governments, which can be subject to FOI laws and general 
administrative law principles.   
This article argues for applying freedom of information doctrines 
to curtail the power of corporations6 and to empower individuals and 
groups coming into contact with them.  It proposes imposing a 
“general duty of disclosure” on corporations, in contrast to the 
existing disclosure requirements which only apply to specific 
positively and explicitly predefined issues, such as financial 
information, nutritional data, pollution emissions, and the like. 
 
Europe (2002), available at www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-
information-survey-of-central-and-e.pdf. 
 4. See Part II below. 
 5. Numerous accounts detail how much information is generated and stored globally by 
organizations with varying numbers due to the difficulty in measuring this data.  But all 
estimates agree that data is collected in an ever-accelerating pace.  For a list of these attempts to 
assess the amount of global information see, JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., BIG DATA: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2001), available at 
www.mckinsey.com/insights/ mgi/ research/technology_and_innovation/big_data_the_next_
frontier_for_innovation. 
One example of the volume of information held by corporations appeared in a 2008 report 
on “petabyte power players” customers of the data warehouse company Teradata.  These 
included Ebay petabytes of data, and Wal-Mart storing 2.5 petabytes of data.  See Eric Lai, 
Teradata Creates Elite Club for Petabyte-Plus Data Warehouse Customers, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Sept. 10, 2012), www.computerworld.com/s/article/9117159/Teradata_creates_elite_club_for_
peta byte_plus_data_warehouse_customers.  Just two years earlier it was estimated that all the 
world’s countries outside of North America, Western Europe, and the developed countries of 
Asia and the Pacific Rim put together hold no more than 8 petabytes of information (held by 
governments, corporations and individuals together). See John F. Grantz, THE EXPANDING 
DIGITAL UNIVERSE: A FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2010 
(2007), available at www.emc.com/ collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digital-idc-white-
paper.pdf.  In 2012 Microsoft said that for its search engine alone (Bing) it stores no less than 
300 petabytes of information.  See Paul McDougall, Microsoft Stress-Tests Windows Server 2012 




 6. The term “corporations” in this paper refers to commercial corporations.  Some of the 
arguments presented here will also hold true for nonprofit organizations, but others do not, and 
their separate characteristics require a separate discussion. 
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This article will first review the rise in power of private 
corporations and their entry into a wide range of activities of public 
nature.  This discussion will provide the foundation for the argument 
that tools, such as FOI, should be used to restrain corporate power.  
The third section presents areas where substantial right to FOI 
already exists.  This review will serve two purposes: First, it will show 
that the principle of FOI as it applies to corporations already exists in 
law.  Secondly, it will differentiate between the general duty of 
disclosure recommended by this article and existing law.  The fourth 
section of this article will examine the extent to which widely 
accepted justifications for subjecting governments to FOI laws can be 
reasonably applied to corporations, as well as some additional 
justification unique to corporations.  The fifth part will review models 
for freedom of corporate information already in use in various 
countries.  Finally, the last section will establish the justifications for 
extending a general duty of disclosure to corporations. 
The measures proposed in this article run counter to the way 
many view the legal relationships among private citizens, 
corporations, and the state.  This article intends to justify, through the 
prism of freedom of information, a renewed discussion of these 
relationships that reflect the contemporary power dynamics among 
them. 
 
II.  THE STRENGTHENING OF CORPORATE POWER 
AND CORPORATIONS’ GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
For centuries, states held power unmatched by other entities 
brought about because of their control of force, capital, and 
information.7  However, activities and services formerly controlled 
and provided by the state have passed to private hands, and as the 
power of nations weakens, corporations claim more influence.8  This 
 
 7. See generally ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE 
AT THE EDGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY  (1990) (stating three important sources of power 
controlled by the states are 1) Force, as the state hold a monopoly over the application of force 
in its territory; 2) Capital, because the state has authority to set and collect taxes; and 3) 
Information, as the state was the leading producer and collector of information, and because it 
controlled education and information systems). 
 8. For a discussion of the weakening of the state, see SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF 
THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996); cf. LINDA WEISS, 
THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE (1998) (arguing that states are not weakening by these 
processes); for a description of the changes created by globalization in the basic character of 
state sovereignty, see SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF 
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shift in power warrants the need to provide mechanisms to prevent 
abuses by corporations.  
The dramatic strengthening of corporate power over the past 
century is steadily intensifying.  According to one study, of the 100 
largest world economies in 2010, forty-two were private corporations.9  
The tremendous influence of these corporations casts a large shadow 
and extends to multiple facets of society.  For example, the policy of a 
few banks practicing high-risk-taking policy led to the 2008 global 
economic crisis.10  General Motors’ decision to close its plant in Flint, 
Michigan turned a once thriving city into a ghost town suffering from 
high rate of unemployment, drugs, and crimes.11 
As corporations amass more power, they also increasingly exert 
more control through privatization.  Privatization refers to processes 
involving the transfer of public property to private hands through 
deregulation and outsourcing.12 Privatization invites corporate 
involvement in the provision of governmental services and in return, 
privatization brings an increased level of government regulation to 
the private sphere.  An outcome of privatization “has been a 
pervasive blurring of the boundaries between the public and private 
sectors.”13  Since FOI laws are considered part of public law and 
corporate law as part of private law,14 the blurring of boundaries 
 
GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
 9. Democracy Leadership Council, The World’s Top 50 Economies: 44 countries, six firms, 
DLC (July 14, 2010), www.dlc.org/ndol_cie5ae.html?kaid=108&subid=900003&contentid=
255173.  A different survey puts the number at 51 of 100 already at the turn of the century.  See 
generally SARAH ANDERASON & JOHN CAVANAGH, CORPORATE VS. COUNTRY ECONOMIC 
CLOUT: THE TOP 100 (2d Ed., 2005).   Other researchers have criticized these figures, but even 
according to more conservative estimates, no fewer than thirty-seven corporations were listed 
among the one hundred largest economies in the world already in 2002.  See Paul De Grauwe & 
Filip Camerman, How Big Are the Big Multinational Companies, in TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
ECONOMIE EN MANAGEMENT 3 XLVII  311, 317 (2002). 
 10. See generally MARTIN N. BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELIOT, THE US Financial AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DO WE STAND AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (2009). 
 11. ROGER AND ME (Michael Moor 1989).  The title of the film is based on the attempts 
made by director Michael Moore to meet with GM CEO, Roger Smith, to discuss his decision to 
close the plant.  The CEO’s refusal to be interviewed reflects the corporations working 
assumption that it owes no explanations to the community, and must only seek the approval of 
its shareholders.  For another description of the all encompassing effect of a corporation on a 
state, see JAMES PHELAN & ROBERT POZEN, THE COMPANY STATE, RALPH NADER’S STUDY 
GROUP REPORT ON DUPONT IN DELAWARE (1973). 
 12. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1519 (2001) (for additional models) [hereinafter Beermann I]. 
 13. Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture:  Dream or Nightmare?, 
68 SOC. SERV. REV. 33, 35 (1994). 
 14. Although an interesting and compelling view has been voiced that “. . . the law of 
corporations should be evaluated more as a branch of public law, the kinds of law that concerns 
society more generally, such as constitutional law or environmental law” and that “[o]nce 
corporate law is correctly seen as public law, it will be clear that significant changes should be 
made.”  KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (2006). 
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challenge traditional classifications and provides the opportunity to 
apply FOI principles to the private sector as opposed to limiting them 
to public agencies alone.15 
Many legal scholars propose imposing public law obligations to 
accompany privatization.16  However, relying on privatization alone as 
a justification is overly formalistic.  Many corporations never become 
privatized in the broad sense of the term, yet operate in the public 
realms.  Cellular communication and internet service providers fit this 
description because they control infrastructure of extreme public 
importance and possess an abundant amount of information on 
individuals such that their conduct may lead to breach of privacy 
rights of consumers.  The release of “The Global Intelligence Files” 
by Wikileaks in February 2012 highlights this problem.17  There, 
millions of emails exchanged within “Stratfor,” a private commercial 
global intelligence firm, were distributed to the public.  The released 
information documented a full-blown intelligence apparatus that 
engaged in widespread covert monitoring and the selling of 
information to private corporations and governments.18  Based on the 
clearly public nature of the information, this article will argue the 
corporation should be viewed as a public entity. 
 
 
 15. This article does not argue that corporations and governments have become to be one 
that they are indistinguishable.  It does argue that many characteristics of the latter have come 
to characterize the former as well, and this should bear consequences.  States’ monopoly over 
the use of physical force is at least one significant difference between governments and 
corporations.  Max Weber, Politics as Vocation (1919), available at www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/
ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf.  But even so, governments are rapidly authorizing corporations to 
apply forces to reach various ends.   For a nonexhaustive list of examples, see P.W. SINGER, 
CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY (2003).  In some cases they 
are even given at least a temporary “free hand” to use force.  Id. at 3–4. 
 16. Daphne Barak-Erez, Civil Rights in the Privatized State: A Comparative View, 28 
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 503, 511–13 (1999); Daphne Barak-Frez, A State Action Doctrine for an 
Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995); Jack M. Beermann, Administrative 
Law-Like Obligations on Private(ized) Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002) [hereinafter 
Beermann II]; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); 
David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution and 
Administrative Law Norms, 35 ADMIN. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 103 (2005). 
 17. THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE FILES (Feb. 27, 2012), available at wikileaks.org/ the-
gifiles.html.   
 18. The files show systematic monitoring of activists whose work was perceived as 
potentially damaging to Stratfor clients’ interests, for instance those involved in the campaign 
for victims of the 1984 Bhopal, India tragedy.  See  Release Stratford monitored Bhopal activists 
including The Yes Men for Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE 
FILES, http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-02-27-00-stratford-monitored-bhopal-
activists-including.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).  The corporation has even been presented as 
a “shadow” CIA.  See Wikileaks Targets Global Risk Company Stratfor, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 
2012), available at  www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/wikileaks-stratfor-idUSL5E8DR
0120120227. 
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III.  EXISTING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Slowly but steadily, much has been done over the past century to 
increase corporate transparency.  During the second half of the 20th 
century the U.S. enacted legislations demanding consumer product 
disclosure that recognized the right of consumers to receive 
information on an array of consumer goods and services, including 
the ingredients used in food products,19 results of clinical tests 
performed on pharmaceutical products,20 any potential harmful 
components in children’s products,21 information on the danger of 
medical treatment and quality of health care institutions,22 and the 
management of private data.23  The U.S. similarly enacted laws 
requiring corporations in the industrial sector to document and report 
certain actions significantly affecting the environment,24 including the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
(“EPCRA”) passed in 1985 to compel factories to report to state and 
local authorities all dangerous substances created and released into 
 
 19. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051•2089 (2012); Consumer 
Credit Disclosure Law, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601•1667F (2012); Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered section of 21 
U.S.C.); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2811 (2012); Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-399D (2012); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (USA), 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1461 (2012); Consumer Information Act 1978 (Act No. 1/1978).   
 20. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. Law No. 110–85, 
121 Stat 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 21.  See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-314, 122 
Stat. 3016 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 22. See Aharon D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: 
Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999). 
 23. For California law on the management of private data, see Breach Disclosure Statute, 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29 (2012).  Similar legislation was enacted in thirty-three U.S. states.  See 
Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 913, 915 (2006).  Such law already exists in Japan, see id. at 915 n.8, and is gaining 
momentum in other countries, see Alana Maurushat, Data Breach Notification Law Across the 
World from California to Australia, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FACULTY OF LAW 
RESEARCH SERIES 11, 15 (2009). 
 24. For a general description of several of these laws, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY,  www.epa.gov/epahome/r2k.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
  The first international binding obligation that requires signatories to disclose pollutant 
emission was the adopted in 2003 under the Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers.  The Protocol became valid in October 2009, after it was ratified by half of the 36 
nations.  UNECE, www.unece.org/env/pp/prtr.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).  The Protocol 
requires member states to create nation-wide pollutant release and transfer registers open to the 
public and accessible on the internet.    
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the environment as a result of their operations.25  Similar regulations 
were enacted in the United Kingdom in 2004.26  
 Progress has also been made in the financial sector where public 
corporations,27 and to a lesser extent privately owned companies, must 
disclose significant financial information to the public.  The change, 
however, is far from sufficient.  While the economic crisis of 192928 
and the public outcry following the Enron and Worldcom debacle 
served as backdrops for meaningful legislative steps in imposing 
disclosure obligations on corporations,29 the 2008 global financial 
crisis did not produced similar legislative progress.  Some explain this 
phenomenon by arguing that legislative changes have, by and large, 
been exhausted as an effective remedy to market failures, and that 
new preventive measures should be sought elsewhere.30  Furthermore, 
while progress has been made, the current financial disclosure regime 
applies mostly to publicly traded corporations and not closely-held 
corporations.  The current regulations require that companies 
disclose pertinent information to shareholders, but do not require 
disclosure of information to other parties who may require protection 
and be interested, for instance employees, suppliers, and consumers.  
Financial losses sustained by workers and consumers may at times be 
greater than losses sustained by shareholders.31  
 
 25. Emergency planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 1101–11050 
(2012). 
 26. The Environmental Information Regulations 2004, S.I. 2004 No. 3391 (U.K.).  The law 
compels companies to make information available to the public by electronic means.  Id. at § 4.  
 27. The listing of public companies for trade and debt, and their disclosure obligations in 
the U.S. were imposed in several federal legislations, the most important of them being: 
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1–28, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1–
39, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2012) [hereinafter SEC Act]; The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1, 15 
U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) [hereinafter SOX Act].  For a description of the legislations and their full 
text, see The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, www.sec.gov/ about/laws.shtml (last visited July 31, 2012). 
 28. See Joel Seligman, Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. 
CORP. L. 1 (1983) 
 29. The SOX Act was legislated with a majority of 334 supporters against 90 opposed in the 
House of Representatives (Final Vote Results for Roll Call, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK (Apr. 24, 2002), clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll110.xml), and with a 
majority of 99 supporters with none opposed in the Senate (U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 102nd 
Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE LEGISLATION AND RECORDS (July 25, 2002), 
www.senate.gov/legislative/ LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=
2&vote=00192). 
 30. See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, Univ. of Manchester, The Global Financial Crisis, the 
Disclosure Paradigm, and European Financial Regulation: the Case for Reform, Address at the 
EUROFRAME conference (June 1, 2009) (arguing that much information was available to 
investors to point towards a possible crisis, yet they failed to respond in the expected way, 
necessitating interventionist regulation beyond disclosure enforcement). 
 31. See, e.g., Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, supra note 1, at 346. 
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 Presently, there is no legal duty to disclose information of the 
type that was uncovered by the Enron investigation,32 including 
boundless wastefulness, attempts to influence political appointments, 
nepotism, and more.33  In a FOI regime, an investigative reporter 
could demand certain information from the company, improper 
practices like the ones in Enron would have been more difficult to 
hide and potentially limited the magnitude of the tragedy.  However, 
any demand to allow access to such information in the present legal 
situation would be ignored and considered ludicrous. 
While corporations are required to disclose significantly more 
information than in the past, disclosure remains the exception to the 
general rule of secrecy. 
 
IV.  THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST FREEDOM OF 
CORPORATE INFORMATION 
 
Freedom of information laws exist today in almost every liberal 
democracy and even in several nondemocratic states;34 many deem 
FOI a constitutional right.35  Four justifications have been used for 
recognizing FOI in the government context.  Using these justifications 
as bases, this article will apply them to information held by private 
corporations.36  After doing so and providing counter arguments 
 
 32. Tim Grieve, The Decline and Fall of the Enron Empire (2003), available at 
dir.salon.com/ story/news/feature/2003/10/14/enron/index.html. 
 33. The documents and correspondence that were seized during the investigation of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are available in full over the internet on several 
websites that have added search and referencing services for public use of those interested or 
the simply curious.  See, e.g., Public Domain Enron Email Corpus and Database, (July 31, 2012), 
www.enron-mail.com. This published material raises serious questions in regard to the balancing 
of the right of the public to be informed, and the right for privacy, which are worthy of an 
additional in depth discussion, but which lie outside the scope of this article. 
 34. For the list of the states in which Freedom of Information Acts were enacted up to 
September 2009, see Roger Vleugels, Overview of All 90 FOIA Countries and Territories, 
available at right2info.org/laws/Vleugels-Overview-86-FOIA-Countries-9.08.pdf. 
Since this publication, freedom of information acts have also been legislated in Guatemala, 
Uruguay, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, the Moldavian islands, Malta, Nigeria and the 
Philippines.  However, in some of these countries, they have yet to come into effect. 
 35. In two thirds of the countries belonging to the European Union Council, freedom of 
information is enumerated in the constitution, see Access to Information: A Fundamental 
Right, A Universal Standard (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.access-info.org/documents/ 
Access_Docs/Thinking/Get_Connected/Access_Info_Europe_Briefing_Paper.pdf. 
For an extensive discussion of the constitutional characteristics of the right, see Roy Peled 
& Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Know, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 360 
(2011). 
 36. The summary of the justifications as they applies to the government is based on the 
analysis appearing in Rabin and Peled.  Peled & Rabin, supra note 35, at 360. 
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against their applicability, I will further provide justifications that are 
unique to commercial corporations. 
 
A.  APPLYING GENERAL FOI JUSTIFICATIONS TO CORPORATE 
INFORMATION  
 
1.  The Political–Democratic Justification 
 
The right to information is a prerequisite to a democratic regime 
because such a right enables citizens to actively participate in the 
democratic process, a critical element of democracy.  Decisions made 
by citizens based on information filtered by the government cannot 
be considered free and democratic.37  While this justifies FOI in the 
context of the government, can the same be said that involvement in 
the democratic process requires that citizens have the right to access 
information held by corporations? 
To answer this question, take the healthcare debate under the 
Clinton administration as an illustration.38  There, the Health 
Insurance Association of America (“HIAA”), comprising of heads of 
insurance companies, was able to successfully prevent the bill from 
becoming law, in large part because it could run a campaign without 
having to disclose potentially damaging information, because it was 
not subject to FOI laws.  For example, the fact that the tobacco 
industry, led by the Philip Morris Corporation, was a significant 
financer of the opposing campaign was not revealed until years later 
when the tobacco companies were obligated to release internal 
documents as part of a master-settlement agreement reached in a 
lawsuit of forty-six U.S. states against the major tobacco companies.39  
 
 37. This was the background for the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 
in the United States, Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552  (1966), and in many other 
democracies in the years to follow.  Such as France, “Law on Access to Administrative 
Documents (1978), Canada “Access to Information Act” (1982), The United Kingdom 
“Freedom of Information Act” (2000) and Germany”: Informationsfreiheitsgesetz ” (2005). For 
the full list of FOI Laws, see Vluegels, supra note 34. 
 38. For a description of the public debate around the plan, and the lack of reliable 
information on its details, see Derek Bok, The Great Health Care Debate of 1993-94, 2 PUBLIC 
TALK: ONLINE JOURNAL OF DISCURSE LEADERSHIP (1998); KANT PATEL, HEALTH CARE 
POLITICS AND POLICY IN AMERICA 383–389 (3rd ed. 2006)Lisa Disch, Publicity - Stunt 
Participation and Sound Bite Polemics: The Health Care Debate 1993-1994, 21 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 3 (1996)Raymond L. Goldsteen et al., Harry and Louise and the Health Care 
Reform: Romancing Public Opinion, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1325 (2001). 
 39. Master Settlement Agreement, National Association of Attorneys General, § 4, Nov. 
23, 1998, available at www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msapdf/1109185724_1032468 
605_cigmsa.pdf. 
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These documents exposed Philip Morris as financing diverse 
“grassroots” initiatives and media advertising campaigns, activating 
biased “commentators,” initiating pseudo-scientific conventions, and 
more.40  But such information that may have negatively affected the 
private healthcare system was kept from the public, preventing the 
public from making a well-informed decision about the health care 
bill.41  Conversely, because the government was subject to the 
Freedom of Information Act, any attempts to raise funds and 
generate “popular” activity in support of the reform were made 
public, and were accompanied by much criticism.42  In fact, the 
opposition could more easily obtain information from the 
government in order to expose the campaign's “behind the scenes” 
information.43   
Corporations are central players in the decision-making 
processes in any western democracy as they exert as much influence 
as senior government executives or political parties.  In order for 
citizens to participate in the democratic process, information held by 
corporations should be made widely and easily available so that the 
public may form its views when partaking in the political process. 
 
2.  The Oversight Justification 
 
In the context of imposing FOI on the government, the public 
has a right to inspect the activities of public entities in order to 
examine these organizations’ level of efficiency and to uncover any 
structural and organizational flaws and corruption.44  Effective 
oversight of government activities requires the government to be 
 
 40. The documents published in the settlement agreement appear on a dedicated Chicago 
University website that allows document searches and displaying, see legacy.library.ucsf.edu. 
For documents exposing the company involvement in anti-reform activities, see, e.g.,   
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=psy67c00&page=1; legacy.library.ucsf.edu/ 
tid/blz55e00; legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/san09e00/pdf. 
 41. This question stood at the root of class action lawsuits against medical insurance 
companies in the U.S., and in their context, a request was made for a decision that would 
require the companies to publicize incentives given to doctors; while the request to submit the 
class action suits was denied, the courts ordered that the information on controversial incentives 
be made public.   
 42. Online NewsHour: The Healthcare Debate Leading up to Clinton’s Healthcare Address 
to Congress; Ezra Klein, The Lessons of ‘94, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 20, 2008, 
www.prospect.org /cs/articles?article=the_lessons_of_94. 
 43. “White House Release Task Force Documents,” ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN 
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, http://www.aapsonline.org/newsletters/oct94.htm.  For the 
documents themselves see, www.aapsonline.org/clinton/AAPS/TASKFORC.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2012). 
 44. Peled & Rabin, supra note 35, at 366. 
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transparent, which helps to reduce corruption.45  Similarly, the 
significant influence of corporations in public discourse warrants 
important interest in supervising corporate activities carried out in 
good faith, but that might be flawed due to negligence, lack of 
professionalism, excess risk-taking or other faults of character or 
judgment which could affect public interests. 
Take as an illustration the accounts that followed the 2003 
Columbia space shuttle disaster.  In the aftermath of this tragic event, 
NASA received requests for information regarding possible causes of 
the explosion pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
While NASA complied with most of the public’s requests46 the 
involvement of United Space Alliance Corporation (“United Space”), 
a company owned jointly by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, restricted 
the amount of information the public could access and thus limited 
the public’s ability to properly evaluate various aspects of the event.  
Because United Space was not bound by FOIA, it did not have to 
disclose information, despite testimonies by high-ranking NASA 
officials stating that United Space’s employees were an integral part 
of the flawed decision-making process that resulted in the disaster.47   
 Considering the public interest in supervising parties involved in 
the Columbia disaster, there is no substantial difference between 
NASA and United Space.  Yet, current laws do not compel 
corporations to disclose interested information.  Should corporations 
be held accountable to the general public in this particular scenario, 
or when they decide to shut down a plant, resulting in thousands in 
layoffs as was the case in Flint, Michigan,48 or when a bank collapses 
putting at stake its clients’ life savings?  What level of accountability  
should corporations be subject to the public? 
According to Anita Allen, accountability operates in the field of 
public administration and corporate governance,49 but FOI laws are 
mechanics of “state accountability.”50 However, Allen’s rationales 
supporting this proposition—including consent, reliance, relationship, 
 
 45. This is a widespread notion, and in the author’s view, a valid one as well.  However it is 
not undisputed. For supporting evidence, see Catherina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, 
Transparency and Corruption: The Conditional Significance of a Free Press, 5 QOG WORKING 
PAPER SERIES, 2005, available at www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350633_2005_5-
lindstedt_naurin.pdf.  For a different view, see Samia Tavares, Do Freedom of Information Laws 
Decrease Corruption?, MPRA PAPER, no. 3560, Nov. 2007, available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/3560. 
 46. NASA, Summary of Records Released under Freedom of Information Act, 
www.nasa.gov/ columbia/foia/index.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
 47. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 16, at 106 
 48. RODGER AND ME, supra note 11. 
 49. ANITA ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING 22 (2003). 
 50. Id. 
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and public need—only marginally distinguish between states and 
corporations.  Public officials have indeed implicitly conceded to 
operating in the sunlight, and it is hard to say the same of officials in 
commercial corporations.51  However, implicit consent is the result of 
public atmosphere and expectations.  These did not exist a century 
ago when government officials would not have conceded to the 
openness we know today.  This might change for corporate officials in 
the future as well; Reliance is often induced by corporations.  Clearly 
GM employees in Flint, Michigan relied on GM for their livelihood, 
just as people whose life savings depended on the prudence of 
managers at Lehman Brothers relied on them.  Relationships also 
induce accountability.52 But employees, customers, providers, even 
neighbors, are all engaged in relationships that can be seen to render 
the corporation accountable to them.  Finally, people are accountable 
to the public where there is a compelling public interest, such as that 
of the accountability of people with AIDS or tuberculosis, because of 
the government’s responsibility to contain highly contagious diseases.  
But the same might be said for governmental obligation to protect a 
public interest such as the stability of the financial sector. 
According to Allen, accountability requires accessibility and 
transparency.  Allen’s justifications fit corporations just as they fit 
governments and strengthen the argument for corporate 
transparency. 
 
3.  The Instrumental Justification 
 
The rationale for extending FOI regime to the government is the 
idea that FOI is instrumental, if not a necessary link, for the exercise 
of numerous civil rights, including the right to freedom of 
expression.53  The ability to advocate for social rights hinges on the 
ability to access information.  The growing effectiveness of civil 
society organizations to sway public policy has been credited to a 
greater access to information, which allows these organizations to 
stand as equals before government representatives, who traditionally 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See supra note 49.   
 53. John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandovel-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom 
of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85,  88–89 (2006); see also Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Freedom of 
opinion and expression” found in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 includes the right “to request and receive information.”); see also International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (16 Dec., 1966) (Article 19 states that 
“[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”). 
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enjoyed a substantial advantage as a result of their exclusive control 
of information.54   
But governments no longer hold a monopoly over the creation or 
distribution of information.  As corporations gain more power and as 
privatization blurs the boundaries between the private and public 
realms, corporations are active players in both the creation and 
distribution of information.  As too much unchecked power in the 
hands of government lead to corruption and at times, human rights 
abuses, the same is true when power is left unchecked in the hands of 
corporations; the Wikileaks illustration above serves as an example of 
such abuse. 
As access to information held by the government is necessary to 
stand as equal before the government, the same is true for needing 
access to information held by corporations to advance one’s 
viewpoint in society.  For instance, in order for interested parties to 
effectively raise awareness of America’s continued presence in Iraq 
requires access to information such as the fact that more than 64,000 
private contractors were left in Iraq after the U.S. withdrew its forces 
beginning August 2010.55  But without more stringent laws obligating 
private corporations to be more transparent, advocates are faced with 
a difficult task in advancing their position, leaving the public with the 
false impression that American engagement in Iraq has ceased. 
Furthermore, individuals directly affected by the actions of 
private contractors in Iraq and other war zones may need access to 
information held by these corporations to effectively hold them 
accountable for human rights abuses.  Contrast these two cases.  
Using the FOIA, U.S. human rights organizations successfully 
compelled the CIA as well as the Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel to turn over information revealing torture methods 
inflicted on Guantanamo Bay detainees by the CIA.56  In contrast, 
despite investigations into reports of detainee abuses by private 
corporate employees at the Abu-Ghraib prison,57 the public did not 
gain similar access to information regarding human rights abuses by 
 
 54. JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CTIIZEN GROUPS 
132 (1999); THEDA SKOCPOL, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 377 (1999). 
 55. COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 
TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS; FINAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS (August 2011) available at www.wartimecontracting.gov.  For many of 
these documents, see Accountability for Torture, ACLU, www.aclu.org/accountability/
released.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
 56. For many of these documents, see accountability for torture, ACLU, www.aclu.org/ 
accountability/released.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
 57. For a detailed description of such allegations, see Second Amended Complaint, Al Rawi 
v. Titan Corp., No. 04CV 1143 R, 2004 WL 1380538 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2004). 
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employees of the private corporations employed in the facility.58  
While some relevant information was disclosed in the course of 
litigation, the activities of private contractors remain immune from 
inspection.59 
4.  The Proprietary Justification60 
 
The rationale for extending FOI to the government is the idea 
that information is property, and public authorities are trustees while 
citizens are owners and beneficiaries of such property.  As such, 
citizens are entitled to have free access to such information, and 
control of information by civil servants is justifiable as a result of their 
positions as public trustees.  Any limits on the public’s access to such 
information should emanate only from the need to protect the 
interests of other owners, that is, other members of the general 
public.   
Similarly, corporation could be said to be trustee of information, 
holding it in trust for its owner, the public.  However, since the 
owners of a corporation are shareholders, information belongs to the 
shareholders, and them alone, and thus a corporation does not owe 
an obligation to the public to use or access its property.  Underlying 
this rationale is the conventional perception that a person’s property 
is his “sole and despotic dominion,”61 and that he can utilize this 
property as he sees fit, including denying others the right to use or 
access it.  In this view, a corporation may exclude others from using 
and accessing its information.   
 
 58. What were the internal memos directing employees of Titan and CACI, two private 
contractors providing translation and interrogation services to the U.S. military, in regard to 
treatment of detainees?  How were complaints dealt with, if at all?  What were the standards for 
hiring individuals to work for these companies? 
 59. While the exposure of the Abu-Ghraib scandal moved legislators and international 
institutions to act, no substantive change came of it.  In 2007, then Senator Barak Obama 
introduced a bill to increase transparency in the work of military contractors, but the bill never 
became law.  Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 
2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. (2007).  The U.N. Human Rights Council issued a report calling on the 
U.S. “to ensure that all requirements for transparency and oversight apply when contracting.”  
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, A/
HRC/15/25/Add.3 (July 2, 2010).  Nevertheless, the U.N. report did not have much meaningful 
impact on the U.S. 
 60. For purposes of this discussion, I do not intend to address the question of the 
proprietary status of information.  Information is currently recognized as property.  The 
question here is what proprietary regime ought to be applied to information in the possession of 
commercial corporations.  Extensive writings have addressed the proprietary status of 
information.  See, e.g., Arthur S. ; ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION 
(1995).   
  61. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1847) 
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Over the past decades, however, scholars have proposednew 
views on the rights and entitlements of property ownership.62 The 
“stakeholder theory,”63 which arose in the mid-1980s,64 defines a 
stakeholder as “any group or individual that is affected by, or can 
affect the achieving of the objectives of the organization.”65  This view 
spawned new theories about the duties corporations owe to their 
stakeholders,66 including the sharing of information with 
stakeholders.67  These theories, however, deal with the expectation 
that a corporation will, on its own and as part of its “social 
responsibility,” determine to what level they would recognize the 
interests of its stakeholders.  Thus the question as to how much 
corporations must disclose to their different “stakeholders” remains a 
determination made by corporate management and owners. 
Other scholars have suggested more far-reaching approaches to 
the division of rights within a corporation.  Robert Dahl considers 
giant corporations such as General Motors to be political institutions 
and, as such, ownership in them should not be treated as belonging to 
the field of private property.68  Joseph Singer, in a 1988 article,69claims 
that since employees have a possessory right to their place of 
employment,70 employees should be allowed to receive information 
relevant to help them determine whether the owners are drawing 
dividends in a way that might jeopardize the stability of the business, 
or information that would allow them to recognize signs that the 
business might be closing.71  John McCall argues that employees’ right 
to co-determine corporate policy (from coffee-break schedule to 
 
 62. See, e.g., M. A. Honroe, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. G. 
Guest ed., 1961); STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990). 
 63. The theory was first presented in R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: 
A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).  For a review of different uses of the term, see  
 64. Similar ideas were presented as early as 1932, see  
 65. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 
at 46 (1984). 
 66. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, where the court ruled that “The business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders.  The powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end.”  204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 67. In a rating of 12 levels of interest on “interest holders” in the life of the corporation, 
informing was rated as third by the writers, Friedman and Mills.  It should be noted that 
informing is discussed there, and this is a term that leaves the initiative in the hands of the 
organizations.  It is less intrusive than an obligation to provide access to information seekers.  
However, the difference is not necessarily substantial in regard to organizations that are not 
hiding information for improper purposes. 
 68. Robert A. Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN 
AMERICA 10, 18 (Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973). 
 69. Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). 
 70. Id. at 699. 
 71. Id. at 740. 
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closing plants) should trump current understanding of property 
rights.72 
Important for our discussion here is that today’s discourse on 
property recognizes various kinds and degrees of proprietary rights.  
Ownership is no longer necessarily seen as a right that precludes all 
others from access to the property, especially when the property is 
publicly situated.  Furthermore, property owners are often subjected 
to various limitations on how to manage their private property.73  
Thus, that information is held by a corporation cannot preclude its 
duty to allow the public to access to such information. 
 
B.  DEFENDING “CORPORATE RIGHTS” 
 
 Countering the idea that the public has the right to be informed 
is the rationale that corporations have guaranteed constitutional 
rights.74  While the presumption that corporations should be afforded 
basic constitutional rights was not the initial interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution,75 any doubt otherwise is put to rest following the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
 
 72. John J. McCall, Employee Voice in Corporate Governance: A Defense of Strong 
Participation Rights, 11 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY 195, 195 (2001). 
 73. For instance zoning laws and regulatory takings. 
 74. Int’l. Dairy Foods Ass’n. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
Vermont state law requiring the labeling of products manufactured from growth hormone 
injected cows unconstitutional because it violates the corporation’s freedom to refrain from 
speech).  See Dean Ritz, When Silence is Not Golden: Negative Free Speech and Human Rights 
for Corporations, 5 BY WHAT AUTHORITY 2 (2003), available at poclad.org/bwa/spring03.htm.  
 75. The recognition that U.S. corporations are guaranteed constitutional rights came nearly 
a century after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.  The initial interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution was that only fresh and blood human beings are afforded constitutional rights; in 
fact, in 1855, the U.S. Supreme Court still referred to corporations as an “artificial invention.”  
Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 366 (1855) (Campbell, J. dissenting) (stating that “it cannot be“ 
that “a mere legal entity, an artificial person, invisible, intangible, can be a citizen of the United 
States in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution.”).  This changed in 1886, when 
a comment was added to the report of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. P. 
R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  The report documented oral exchange in courtroom by the justices 
expressing their opinion, before the parties begun arguments, that a corporation should be 
considered a "person" and should enjoy the right of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Despite frequent misquotes that cite it as a precedent, in reality, it is not part of 
the ruling.  See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. City of New York 8 S. Ct. 1385, 1387 (1886); Kentucky 
Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp. 262 US 544, 500 (1923); First Nat. Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti 435 US 765, 822. 
  For recount of the statements between the justices, see Frank Wagner, Davis Strikes 
Again!, 23(2) THE CATCHLINE: BULLETIN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF REPORTERS OF JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS (2005), available at arjd.washlaw.edu/Catchline_april_2005.htm.   A copy of the 
original correspondence is available at www.de-fact-o.com/factread.php?id=33.   
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Committee.76  There, the Court ruled that corporations are afforded 
the right to freedom of expression, and Congress may not limit 
corporations’ right to make political expenditures for electioneering 
communications, a form of speech, unless there is a compelling 
government interest.77  While the Court admitted corporations are 
merely “associations of citizens,”78 it struck down statutory provisions 
requiring corporations that spend money on electioneering 
communications to disclose their identity.79  Since Citizens United, 
corporations enjoy immense freedom to spend on election 
campaigns.80  
Advocates of corporations possessing constitutional rights base 
their position on the following rationales: (1) the recognition of 
corporate right protects the people standing behind the corporation, 
namely, the shareholders; (2) in effect, this protects individuals’ 
freedom of association; and (3) corporations perform a vital function 
in society.  This article will respond to each of the rationales put 
forward.81 
First, the assertion that constitutional protection for corporations 
is necessary to protect constitutional rights of its shareholders is 
without merit.  There is no reason why shareholders should not be 
brought center stage to examine the actual harm they may personally 
sustain.  For example, assume a surprise inspection by the tax 
authorities at a company’s headquarters amounts to violation of the 
corporation’s constitutional rights to privacy.  Here, what needs to be 
examined is whether such an inspection breaches the shareholders’ 
right to privacy without having to resort to examining the 
constitutional rights of the corporation.  One could examine the two 
rights separately and indeed, such analysis may lead to different 
results.82  In the same fashion, one need not consider whether the 
marking of milk products in Vermont violates the corporation’s “right 
 
 76. Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876  (2010). 
 77. Id. at 898 . 
 78. Id. at 900. 
 79. Id. at 913. 
 80. See, e.g., Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Political Action Committees (“PACs”) that spend money on electioneering activities, but 
do not contribute to other PACs or directly to candidates’ campaigns, may receive unlimited 
donations from undisclosed donor’s).  
 81. These arguments were presented by Prof. Aharon Barak, retired President of the 
Supreme Court of Israel in HCJ 4593/05 United Mizrachi Bank v. the Prime Minister of Israel 
(2006) (in Hebrew). 
 82. The corporation’s right to privacy is protected under the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978), the Supreme Court held 
that spot inspection of federal safety authorities at a workplace violated the corporation’s 
constitutional right of privacy. 
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not to be forced to speech” but whether forcing such speech upon the 
corporation is the same as forcing it upon shareholders. 
Second, the basis for allowing corporations to assert protection 
under the U.S. Constitution as a mean to protect individuals’ freedom 
of association—because people should not be deprived of 
constitutional rights when they act collectively—is also flawed.  
Freedom of association entitles individuals to certain rights such that 
denial of some of these may indeed render freedom to association 
meaningless.  To deny unions’ collective bargaining power, for 
example, would effectively render freedom of association 
meaningless.  But other rights, while beneficial to the freedom of 
association, are not the raison d’etre for the freedom of association, 
and the denial of them cannot be said to violate this right.  For 
instance, providing incorporated businesses with lower tax rates 
clearly benefits these businesses, but raising taxes cannot be said to 
violate shareholders’ freedom of association, even if higher taxes 
make incorporation less appealing.  
Finally, the rationale that corporations should be afforded 
constitutional because corporations perform a vital function in society 
is meritless.  While corporations undoubtedly fulfill a vital role in 
society, this fact alone does not justify affording them constitutional 
rights.  Much like corporations, governments also provide society 
with vital functions and yet governments are not given any 
constitutional rights, nor claim any natural or pre-legal rights.  They 
are allowed to carry out only those actions explicitly established by 
law. 
But while the rationales for allowing corporations to assert rights 
under the U.S. Constitution are precarious at best, we will proceeds 
assuming that corporations are indeed entitled to them. 
 
1.  The Breach of the Right to Property 
 
The basis for asserting that corporations should not be subject to 
a FOI regime is that doing so would violate their right to property, 
which we must also assume constitutes the right to prevent public 
access.83  But even when we assume that corporations possess the right 
to property, scholars such as Hanoch Dagan maintain that under 
certain contexts, the right to property itself obligates the owner to 
 
 83. For a comprehensive description, supporters, and critics of the concept that property 
right does not necessarily encompass the right to exclude others from use and access, see 
generally Hanoch Dagan, Exclusion and Inclusion in Property, 109 TEL-AVIV UNIV. LEGAL 
WORKING PAPERS SERIES (2009). 
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grant public access.84  According to Dagan, property ownership is a 
relationship status between the owner and his community, such that 
in return for society making available its resources to protect the 
owner’s property,85 society then bears an obligation to protect its 
members who are not the owners of such property.86  Indeed, where 
public access to proprietary information does not harm the owner’s 
reasonable enjoyment of such property, permitting public access is 
not merely appropriate but a duty that originates from the owner’s 
social responsibility that is integral to his property right.87 
It is important to distinguish the following two arguments about 
property rights.  First is the argument that the value of a corporation 
depreciates when information about certain property is disclosed.  
For instance, “the Coca Cola formula” is a valuable property that 
would lose value if disclosed to the public).  In this scenario, the 
public should not have access rights.  Distinguish this argument from 
the second argument, which asserts that the corporation would lose 
profits if it were required to disclose information it deems harmful to 
the corporation, which is different from preventing public access to an 
invention as in the Coca Cola formula.  Under the second scenario, 
the public should have access rights. Publishing an internal report 
exposing a bank’s corruption by management, for example, could 
likely result in profit losses, but withholding such information harms 
stakeholders who hold some access rights. 
 
2.  Breach of the “Freedom of Commercial Speech” 
 
Some argue that disclosure rules constitute “forced speech” and 
thus violate the right of corporations to refrain from speaking.88  This 
argument has two weaknesses.  First, the right to refrain from 
providing factual information is counter to declared objectives of 
commercial free speech, which supports the search for truth.89  
 
 84. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011). 
 85. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 772 (1999). 
 86. See also Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1255, 1259 (2006). 
 87. Conceptions of property rights like that of Dagan’s allow us to perceive this right in 
different forms under different contexts.  It is easy, for example, to accept that an owner has a 
right to deny an uninvited guest entry into her home without questioning her motive.  Yet we 
will question the motive of a storeowner who denies customers access into his store, if he does 
so due to such factors as the customers’ race.  The storeowner cannot simply justify his action by 
claiming that he has an absolute, unfettered right to exclude. 
  88. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTING’S 
L.J. 577, n.206 (1989); TR Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, CARDOZO 
L.REV., 2586.   
 89. Abram v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, “the best test of truth is 
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Withholding information, particularly factual information, 
undermines this objective and, therefore, should not be allowed to 
enjoy constitutional protection for commercial freedom of speech.90 
Second, the argument conflates the distinction between (1) the 
existing disclosure duties and (2) the recognition of the right to access 
corporate information.  Compelling disclosure requires corporations 
to actively take steps to present information to the public.  
Corporations are forced to “act” counter to their desires.  One might 
argue, with some difficulty as described above, that this breaches the 
corporations’ freedom to refrain from speech.  On the other hand, 
recognition of a right to access corporate information is in this sense a 
much “softer” enforcement of speech because it merely requires 
corporations to give public access to their documents, where minimal 
action is required and where the corporations are not providing any 
particular expression on the issue.91 Corporations, for example, would 
allow public access to raw data and research results conducted by 
their research department, relating to the effects of the hormones. 
Corporations would not be required to make any declarations, for 
instance, in SEC filings.  They would merely provide information in 
its present state to the requesting party. 
 
3.  Right to Privacy 
 
Whether corporations are guaranteed the right to privacy such 
that it enjoys protection from FIO laws is inconclusive according to 
case law.  For much of the early half of the 20th century, the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to extend the same privacy rights to 
corporations that are available to individuals.92 But in 1978, the 
 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .  That at any 
rate is the theory of our Constitution); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring, “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies . . . the 
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence”). 
 90. One might mistakenly conclude that the same may be applied to individual speech.  Yet 
forcing an individual to speak breaches his right to liberty, a right not easily applied to a 
corporation.  For reasons discussed above, forcing the corporation “to speak” has little to do 
with forced speech of the individuals “behind it,” and hence the same objections do not apply. 
 91. Both systems are not necessarily interchangeable.  At times a FOI rule of law could 
make disclosure obligations unnecessary, but sometimes it would still be practically necessary to 
obligate the manufacturer to disclose the information on his own to the consumer exposed 
directly to the products, and not to wait for a request of information from the public. 
 92. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (holding that a corporation may not 
withhold documents based on the argument that disclosure violates corporations’ right against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment); U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 
(1950) (holding that while General Motors enjoys some rights to privacy, it cannot demand the 
same extent of privacy protection offered to individuals); see also, U.S. v. Agriprocessors, Inc., 
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Supreme Court deviated from its previous decisions when it held that 
a law permitting labor law enforcement agencies to conduct surprise 
inspections of private businesses as unconstitutional as a breached of 
the corporation's privacy right under the Fourth Amendment.93  Yet 
again, the Supreme Court changed course in 2011 when it held that a 
corporation does not enjoy “personal information” exemption in 
section 7(c) of the U.S. FOIA in AT&T v. FCC.94  There, the Court 
upheld the FCC’s decision to disclose to a FOIA requestor 
information collected in the course of an investigation into alleged 
corporate misconducts when the corporation was implementing a 
federal government program.  Notwithstanding this recent decision, 
and despite a checkered history in this area, we can surmise that 
corporations do enjoy some degree of privacy protection, albeit not to 
an equal level or degree offered to individual.95 
Some scholars, such as Richard Posner,96 argue that corporations 
should be granted even greater degree of privacy protection than that 
enjoy by individuals.  In most cases, Posner reasons, individuals avoid 
disclosing information not so they could be “left alone,”97 but rather 
to interact with others and to use private information to mislead and 
manipulate others.98  Conversely, businesses withhold information to 
promote the public interest of compensating entrepreneurs.99   
Posner’s argument, however, fails for two reasons.100  First, there 
is no justification to prefer the right to privacy where withholding 
information may likely prevent the public from having well-informed 
public debates. A great deal of the information withheld by 
corporations meets this description.101  Second, Posner’s argument that 
 
No. 08–CR–1324–LRR, 2009 WL 2255729, at 4 (N.D. Iowa  2009).(adopting the rule in Morton 
Salt, the court dismisses the claim that a corporation can be considered a person for purposes of 
privacy protection).   
 93. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 325–26 (1978).  
 94. F.C.C. v. AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (the court opined that while there are 
precedents establishing that a corporation can legally be “a person,” there is no such rule to 
suggest that “personal” includes “corporate”). 
 95. As a point of comparison, in Australia the Supreme Court in the year 2001 rejected the 
argument that a corporation has a right to privacy.  See generally Lee A. Bygrave, A Right to 
Privacy for Corporations?  Lenah in an International Context, 8 CONTEXT 130 (2001). 
 96. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, 2 REGULATION 19 (1978).  
 97. Louis Brandies & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–96 
(1890). 
 98. Posner, supra note 97 at 20. 
 99. See supra note 98, at 25.  Interestingly, Posner does not contemplate whether 
corporations, too, withhold information to manipulate others. 
 100. The writer’s opinion is that there are good reasons to not apply these conclusions to the 
privacy of individuals, and the right to receive information from them, as Posner suggests, but 
for the purposes of this discussion we need not expound on this point. 
 101. It is worth noting that often information is kept secret to protect its value when it was 
attained with great effort.  However, such information is not the majority of information held by 
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corporations should be given a greater degree of privacy protection 
than individuals because of individuals’ desire to interact with others, 
and hence should waive privacy protection, is just as easily applicable 
to corporations.  The existence of any corporation depends on 
continuous interaction with workers, neighbors, investors, and 
consumers. 
Even when we assume that corporations have constitutionally 
protected privacy rights, the public’s right to be informed is not 
undermined.  These two interests—corporations’ privacy rights and 
individuals’ right to be informed—can be balanced.  Where 
withholding information is motivated by “privacy,” the corporation is 
usually attempting to withhold information that might expose 
unpleasant facts about it, or act to counter a misrepresentation foisted 
upon it by the public.  Even if this privacy claim is valid, in such cases 
it should be given little weight in comparison to the public’s interest 
in supervising corporate practice—similar to how minimal weight 
given to sex offenders in the balance with the public’s interest.102  
Privacy, like patriotism, could become “the last refuge of the 
scoundrel.” 
 
C.  ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
• Promoting the Values of Trust: Trust is a social institution of 
extreme importance,103 but absent external obligations, it 
would be surprising to find a manufacturer who would 
voluntarily disclose that he uses components of inferior 
quality in his products.  But should corporations expect such 
information to become public, they would more likely practice 
a priori honesty.  
• Discovering the Truth and Judicial Efficiency: While discovery 
proceedings104 may lead parties to reveal documents of great 
public interest, such a finding is coincidental and relies on 
 
corporations, and we refer to protecting such value towards the end of this article. 
 102. See Rafshoon G. Scott, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punishment, 
Privacy and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1663, 1647–50 (1995). 
 103. Some consider trust to be a supreme principle, underlying entire fields of law, primarily 
contracts law.  See Eli Bukspan, The Notion of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract and 
Corporate Law: A New Approach to the Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contract, 
2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 229, 231–34 (2006). 
 104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37; Rule 34(c) compels even nonparties to produce documents.  
Some view discovery as a form of “focused freedom of information act, see, e.g., Beermann II, 
supra note 16 liberal discovery rules can function like a more focused version of FOIA, opening 
a great deal of private information to access by opponents in civil actions, which in turn may 
lead to public disclosure of that information”). 
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costly legal proceedings.105  Nevertheless, justifications for 
document disclosure during legal proceedings equally support 
the discovery in the prelegal phase of a dispute.  Such 
discovery might void the need for legal action altogether and 
save the parties expensive billable hours.106 
• Fair Competition, Financial Efficiency, and Economic Growth: 
While champions of free market principles may argue that 
market forces will implement information disclosure but for 
economic inefficiencies,107 scholars have successfully disputed 
this idea,108 and the recent global economic crisis has turned up 
the volume in support of greater corporate transparency, 
while arguments advocating secrecy have been less frequent.109 
Furthermore, some economists argue information disclosure 
would lead to improved risk assessment, which would benefit 
investors110 and the market as a whole.111  Finally, general 
disclosure obligation would induce more fair competition 
because such an obligation may reduce a company’s 
 
 105. Discovery takes place when the services of attorneys are already retained, and judicial 
time is being consumed.  See Amy Luria & John E. Clabby, An Expense out of Control: Rule 33 
Interrogatories After the Advent of Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals for Change, 9 CHAP. L. 
REV. 29, 30–31 (2005). 
 106. For the impact of Civil Procedure Rules on the volume of cases that survive pretrial 
proceedings, see Stephen C Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 631, 649–54 (1994). 
 107. ADRIAN HENRIQUES, CORPORATE TRUTH: THE LIMITS TO TRANSPARENCY 13 (2007). 
 108. Think of Nobel Prizes in Economics conferred upon scholars whose theories focus on 
economic insights that the market itself has failed to recognize.  For instance Daniel Kahneman, 
demonstrating that fairness is a commodity that consumers are willing to pay for—a revelation 
that came after centuries in which businesses did not attribute the existence of any real 
“market” for fair play.  Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and 
the Assumption of Economics, 59 J. BUS. 285 (1986). 
 109. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Peace Prize in economics laureate, has described the connection 
between the lack of information and the fall of the Lehman Brothers investment bank: 
The reason Lehman Brothers went down is twofold; they owned a lot of these bad 
assets but also because the products were so non-transparent, because they’ve 
engaged in so much of this accounting gimmickry that no one had any confidence.  
The financial markets are based on trust . . . . What’s happened has been the lost of 
that trust.   
Joseph Stiglitz on the Fall of Lehman Brothers (2008), available at bigthink.com/josephstiglitz/ 
joseph-stiglitz-on-the-fall-of-lehman-brothers. 
 110. Investors would benefit because financing expenses is lowered where information is 
more readily accessible, and thus investors will not be paying the premium for risks and the 
expenses of financing investigation, 
 111. The market would benefit because low financing costs promote investments and growth 
Robert K. Elliot & Peter D. Jacobson, Costs and Benefits of Business Information Disclosure, 8 
ACCT. HORIZONS 80, 81, 89 (1994).  Additional advantages include a more educated allotment 
of investments, a more lively transfer of funds, as a result of more easily concluded transactions, 
and finally, it would make it much easier to identify those responsible for externalities.  Id. at 90, 
92. 
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competitive advantages from practicing unfair behaviors.  
Companies that attempt to reduce costs by using inferior 
components, for example, would likely tarnish their public 
images.  Thus, disclosure would more accurately reflect the 
company’s behavior and enhance consumer ability to decide 
on which company they wish to support.  
 
V.   CORPORATE DISCOSURE POLICIES ARE WHERE 
THE WORLD IS (SLOWLY) HEADING 
 
A.  THE UNITED STATES 
 
When the U.S. enacted the FOIA112 in 1966, it was the fourth 
nation in the world to sign into law anything like it.113  Since then, 
many countries have instituted similar FOI laws, and some have even 
extended various degrees of FOI laws to corporations, a practice that 
has yet to be seen in the U.S.  
 FOIA provides that only an “agency” shall make available to the 
public certain information114 and empowers federal courts to order an 
“agency” to produce “agency records improperly withheld from an 
individual requesting access.”115  Thus, only “agency records” are 
subject to FIOA.  The Supreme Court, in Forsham v. Harris116 has 
interpreted the “agency records” narrowly and formalistically as to 
protect records possessed by a privately controlled organization from 
being subject to FIOA, despite the fact that the language of the Act 
allows for a more expansive reading.117     
 In Forsham, the Court held that a private corporation does not 
become a public agency because it received grants from a federal 
agency.  There, a diabetes treatment organization initiated a series of 
FOIA requests to the Department of Health (DOH) seeking access 
to raw data that was collected in a research that studied the effects of 
 
 112. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996). 
 113. Following the enactment of similar laws in Sweden (1766), Colombia (1848), and 
Finland (1951).  For a complete chronological list of freedom of information legislation see 
Vleugels, supra note 34. 
 114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) 
 115. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).   
 116. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).  For an interpretation of the decision, see Aman C. Alfred, 
Information, Privacy and Technology: Citizens, Clients or Consumers?, in FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR DAVID WILLIAMS 
323, 329 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000). 
 117. E.g., see Justice Brennan dissent in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. at 187. 
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certain drugs on diabetes treatment.  The study was conducted by 
scientists employed at a private organization, which received grants 
from DOH for the study.  The findings from the study were submitted 
to the DOH, but the raw data, which included fifty-five million data 
entries, was never received by the DOH.  The Court rejected the 
argument that data generated by a private organization may be 
considered “agency records” for the purposes of the Act, merely 
because the private organization received federal study grants.118  
While Congress “sought to expand public rights of access to 
Government information when it enacted [FOIA]. . . that expansion 
was a finite one,” the Court wrote.119 The fact that Congress refrained 
from including private organizations in the scope of FOIA has a 
positive meaning of protecting corporations from being subject to 
FOIA.120   
 The Forsham’s decision, which continued to direct federal judges 
over the next decades,121 created a strange legal situation where 
information possessed by a government agency must be accessible to 
the public, but is closed at the moment where the agency pays a 
private organization to produce similar information.  Furthermore, 
the decision tended to disregard the price of keeping the information 
secret.  The discussion focused on the need to protect the private 
organization, and largely ignored considering the right of the 
petitioner and the right of public access.122 
 
 118. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 182. 
 119. Id. at 178. 
 120. Id. at 180–82.  In his dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that because the government agency 
had used the requested information in its decision making process, it should be considered 
information belonging to the agency.  Id at 189-90.  He further noted, that the “[g]overnment by 
secrecy is no less destructive of democracy if it is carried on within agencies or within private 
organizations serving agencies.  The value of the record to the electorate is not affected . . . .”  
Id.  
 121. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 913 F. Supp. 599 (D.D.C. 1996); Stanley 
v. DOD, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23585 (S.D. Ill. June 22, 1999); Burka v. U.S. Dept. of Health 
and Human Services, 87 F.3d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  Courts have also concluded that FOIA does 
not apply to private prisons;  See Nicole B. Casarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in 
Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 249, 249 (1995) [hereinafter Casarez II]. 
 122. A more flexible discussion of the right to receive information from private organizations 
operating in the United States exists in academic discourse.  See, e.g., Casarez II, supra 121; 
Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 16; Beerman II, supra note 16, at 1507; Mathew D. 
Bunker & Charles N. Davis, Private Governance, 75 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 464 
(1998); Casarez II, supra 121; Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: 
An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 
(1999); Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate Over Privatization 
and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2000); 
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, 
Professionalism and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005).  
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Dissatisfied with the ruling in Forsham, the U.S. Congress in 
1998 established an explicit provision that provides  any research 
information created by public funding would be subject to the Act.123  
In 2007, this provision was expanded to cover any information 
prepared for a government agency.124  Still, neither U.S. case law nor 
the legislator has ever discussed the possibility of ordering a private 
corporation to disclose information when it does not have any 
connection to a public agency. 125 
 
B.  THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The U.K. Freedom of Information Act (“U.K. FOIA”)126 applies 
fully to private organizations in regard to only one field—the 
suppliers of medical services under the National Health Insurance 
Act.127  The U.K. FOIA also gives the minister charged with 
administering the Act the authority to apply the Act to an 
organization that ”appears to the Secretary of State to exercise 
functions of a public nature.”128  While the Act appears to grant the 
minster expansive authority, attempts to subject additional 
organizations to the Act have been disappointing.  The two years 
consultation that began in 2008 to include additional organizations, 
for example, produced poor results,129 as the government rejected the 
majority of the public’s suggestions, and announced its intention to 
apply the law to only four organizations, all of which perform 
functions of an overt public character or are mostly funded by 
taxpayers.130  The department rejected suggestions to apply the U.K. 
 
 123. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).  
 124. Open Government Act (2007), Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).  
 125. Does FCC v. AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1177 (2011), mark a change in the court’s view?  While 
the decision shows little sympathy to the concerns of the communication mega-corporation, the 
answer is most likely negative. The case deals with information clearly held by a federal agency, 
and the court’s opinion is based on textual analysis, rather than a substantial discussion on the 
merits of access to the information requested. 
 126. Freedom of Information Act 2000 (ch. 36), available at www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/ acts2000/
ukpga_20000036_en_1. 
 127. Id. §§ 44, 45. 
 128. Id. § 5(1). 
 129. A report by the Department of Justice of the consultation process offers an impressive 
account of transparency in the governmental decision making process.  It offers a rather 
detailed description of submissions received at the ministry and its considerations in accepting 
or rejecting them. Freedom of Information Act 2000:  Designation of Additional Public 
Authorities—Response to Consultation, available at http://www.data.parliament.uk/
DepositedPapers/Files/ DEP2009-2167/DEP2009-2167.pdf. 
 130. The four organizations subject to U.K. FIOA are 1) Association of Chief Police 
Officers, which plays a role in the development of police services; 2) Financial Ombudsman 
PELED_JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  2/4/2013  1:15 PM 
288 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 9:2 
FOIA to powerful corporations such as big retail chains, private 
schools, and corporations that provide vital services or operate on the 
basis of a contract with a public authority.131  The government 
provided three reasons for its decision: 
1. The high costs that might be imposed on the corporations; 
2. The projected additional workload that would beset the 
government administration to implement the legislation; and 
3. The "economic climate" that has changed since the beginning 
of the consultation, such that the government should not 
burden corporations in economically distressed times. 
 
Yet another round of consultation was launched in 2011,132 and in 
this round, the government asked a long list of corporations, including 
McDonalds,133 to opine on the possibility of being subject to the Act. 
 
C.  ISRAEL 
 
The Israeli Freedom of Information Law134 applies exclusively to 
“classic” public agencies, which, the Israeli Supreme Court has stated, 
is a “closed list.”135  A 2005 amendment added government-owned 
corporations—entities that operate in the field of private law, and 
some include private shareholders—to the list of agencies subject to 
the law.136  
 
Service, which among other tasks, resolves disputes between consumers and financial 
institutions; 3) University and College Admission Service; and 4) “Academies,” i.e., nonprofit 
educational institutions.   
 131. Freedom of Information Act 2000: Designation of Additional Public Authorities—
Response to Consultation, at 14–16. 
 132. See Extending the coverage of Freedom of Information Act 2000 under Section 5, 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE IMPACT ASSESSMENT PAPER, Mar. 4, 2011, available at www.cfoi.org.uk/
MoJ_ draftimpactassessments5.pdf. 
 133. See Martin Roesenbaum, A Big Mac with extra FOIs, please, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2012, 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16443404. 
 134. Freedom of Information Law 5758-1998, available at www.freedominfo.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/documents/Israel--FOIL1998.pdf. 
 135. AdminA 3493/06 Alroy v. the Eged Pension Fund [2006].  In another case the Supreme 
Court refused to bring the committee in charge of appointing judges under the scope of the law, 
in spite of its clear public nature.  The court ruled that “the legislator has chosen not to leave the 
list of public agencies open, enumerating ten categories of agencies.  Hence, only those 
organizations that fit under one of those categories are to be considered public agencies for 
purposes of the law,” HCJ 2283/07 Jurists for Eretz Israel Legal Forum for the Israeli Land v. 
the Committee for Judicial Appointments [2008]. 
 136. Freedom of Information Law (amendment 5) 5767-2007.  Israel’s Government 
Corporations Law defines any company where the state holds more than 50% voting rights as a 
“Government Corporation.”  Government Corporations Law 5735-1975 § 1. 
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Under Israel’s FOI law, the public may request information from 
corporations in two ways.  First, if the information requested is of 
contracts and communications between private corporations and 
public agencies, the requestors may appeal to the public agency to 
attain such information.137 Second, if the information requested are 
reports that the corporation is required to submit to regulators or the 
information is of the type that are collected by regulators under their 
statutory authority, the requestors may request such information by 
filing requests with the appropriate regulators that supervise or 
contract with the private organization. 
Even with such a robust FOI regime, courts rely heavily on 
exemptions under FOI law designed to protect commercial secrets138 
and interests to waive disclosure obligations.  In Keshet Broadcasting 
v. The Second Authority for Television & Radio,139 the Second 
Authority, the regulator of commercial broadcast in Israel, decided to 
disclose tender bids submitted by the petitioners that won a TV 
broadcasting concession.  This was in response to a FOI request 
submitted by two NGOs—the Movement for Freedom of Information 
in Israel and the Directors and Scriptwriters Association.  The 
Supreme Court ruled that the main objective of the FOI law was to 
expose the way public agencies operate to the public, not to “cause 
harm to anyone providing the government agency with information.140  
Thus, “only a very strong public interest could justify exposing 
financial information of a private and commercial organization.”141  
Despite strong public interest in a public resource (e.g., broadcast 
waves) and a clear public interest in supervising one of only two 
commercial TV channels in that nation, the court treated the private 
corporations as owners of the information they were obliged by law 
to hand to the public authority, and thus the corporations could bar 
public access.  
The court concluded that Israel’s FOI law was not designed to 
bring about the delivery of information that was obtained by the 
 
 137. Israel’s Supreme Court has ruled that such connections should be exposed as a general 
rule, and are “Information with a clear public character.” AdminA 6576/01 Liran v. HaHevar 
LeYizum CPM v. Liran PD 56(6) 817 [2002]. 
 138. Section 9(b)(6) to the law.  The courts interpret this exemption widely, in contrast to 
other exemptions designed to benefit public agencies which are interpreted much more 
narrowly.  This displays an intent to leave private corporations unaffected by the “transparency 
revolution.”  It might be expected that if the law were to be amended to cover private entities, 
and the legislator would make clear its will to see corporations accountable to the public, a 
change in judicial interpretation would follow. 
 139. AdminA 10845/06 Keshet Broadcasting v. The Second Authority for Television and 
Radio  Channel Two [2007]. 
 140. See supra note 139, at 18. 
 141. Keshet, art. 101. 
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public agency from a private organization.  The Israeli parliament 
explicitly rejected this notion in relation to environmental affairs. The 
“Environmental Information Law”142 and its regulations state 
explicitly that in regard to pollutant emissions information, private 
information obtained by a public agency is to be disclosed. 
Much like in the U.S., courts are more willing to release 
corporate information during the discovery phase of litigation than 
when the public requests information outside of the litigation 
context.143 
D.   SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa provides a robust framework, unparalleled to other 
nations, for granting the public access to information.144  Article 32 of 
the South African constitution145 provides everyone “the right of 
access to any information held by the state; and any information that 
is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights.”  Indeed, South Africa is the first nation to 
legally grant the public rights to access information from private 
entities, regardless of the entities’ statutory status, public character, or 
relationship to a public authority.146 
Under the Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000) 
(“PAIA”)147 a requester must be given access to any record of a 
 
 142. Freedom of Information Law  5765-2005 (amendment 3 – Environmental Information). 
 143. See e.g., ORC 21945/08 High Net v. Hot (92009) (The Tel Aviv District Court ruled in 
2009 that the “Hot” cable broadcasting company would have to disclose to the defendants 
complete information regarding customers’ complaints received by the companies, as well as the 
results of internal service satisfaction surveys the company conducted.  This demand for 
disclosure would have been dismissed as ludicrous if it had been made by a consumer 
organization for the purpose of publishing the company’s service record.); see also, CAA 
Levayev v. Rephaeli (2009) (The court ordered billionaire Lev Levayev to disclose minutes 
from his company’s board of directors meetings to a board member who wanted to prove a 
claim he had made in a legal proceeding against Levayev, to which the billionaire had withheld 
vital information from a bank negotiating of the purchase of company shares.  A similar request 
for information made by a journalist would not have been heard in the Israeli law system.). 
 144. Despite the sophistication of South African freedom of information regime, the public 
does not frequently use its right to receive information from private organizations Richard 
Calland.  Prizing Open the Profit Making World, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY 
FOR AN OPEN WORLD 214, 232 (Ann Florini ed., 2007). 
 145. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 , available at www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm. 
 146. This unusual legislation may be understood in the context of an accelerated 
privatization process that was taking place at time of its enactment.  See, Afeikhena Jerome, 
Privatization and Regulation in South Africa–An Evaluation, Paper presented at the 3d 
International Conference on Pro-Poor Regulation and Competition: Issues, Policies and 
Practices, Cape Town - South Africa 7-9 September 2004, available at www.competition-
regulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/ Afeikhena.pdf. 
 147. Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000  (S. Afr.) [hereinafter PAIA].  For a 
description of the legislative process and failed attempt to prevent the application of PAIA to 
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private organization if that “record is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights.”148  While PAIA provides for several 
exceptions for mandatory disclosure, section 70 of the PAIA 
overrides these exceptions.  Section 70 provides that a private 
organization must grant a request for access to a record if disclosure 
would reveal evidence of substantial violations of the law or imminent 
danger to the public or environment, or when the public interest in 
disclosure outweighs the interest for the particular exception.149 
Notwithstanding the expansive language of the Article 32 and 
PAIA, courts, however, have construed the public right to access 
information of private corporations narrowly.  In Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa v. African Nat’l Congress, the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) petitioned the High Court of 
South Africa in Cape County to compel the private corporations to 
the suit to disclose records of their contributions to political parties.150  
At issue was whether the record requested is required for the exercise 
or protection of the constitutional rights to “fair elections” and to 
“free political choice.”151  Construing these rights narrowly, the High 
Court only referred to them as rights to direct participation in 
elections.  Holding for the private corporations, the Court found that 
IDASA failed to demonstrate why the requested information was 
necessary for the exercise or defense of the rights direct participate in 
elections.152 
Departing somewhat from the decision in IDASA, the South 
Africa Supreme Court of Appeals, held that a contractual right can  
serve as a basis to obligate a corporation to grant a requester 
information access under PAIA.153  There, the court ordered the 
South African Airlines Corporation to disclose the full details of the 
company’s seat reservation, as opposed to partial data, for one of its 
flights to the company’s retired employee where he was an denied 
 
private entities, see Gideon Pimstone, Going Quietly About Their Business: Access to Corporate 
Information and the Open Democracy Bill, 15 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 2 (1999); Doug Tilton, 
Richard Calland, In Pursuit of Open Democracy and Freedom of Information – A South African 
Campaign Study, 8 CHRI NEWS (2001), available at www.humanrightsinitiative.org/
publications/nl/ articles/south_africa/in_pursuit_of_open_democracy_foi.pdf. 
 148. PAIA, art. 50(1)(a). 
 149. PAIA, art. 70. 
 150. Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr. et al. v. African Nat’l. Cong. et al., 2005 (5) SA 39 (C). 
 151. Id. at ¶ 81. 
 152. See supra note 150; see also, Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v. Davis, 2005 (3) SA 486 (SCA) (the 
court declined a shareholder’s request to access the company’s accounting records in order for 
him to properly evaluate the value of his stocks where he claimed the unreliability of the 
company’s financial statements, because the shareholder did not show cause to doubt the 
reliability of the financial report.  For a criticism of the lower court’s decision to uphold the 
appeal, see  
 153. Claase v. Info. Office of S. Afr. Airways, 2006 SCA 163 (RSA) at para. 7. 
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automatic upgrade to first class before other passengers when seats 
are available.  This benefit was part of his retirement package.  The 
retired employee wished to prove that the company had upgraded 
other passengers before making the seat available to him first. 
Undoubtedly, the recognition of public access to corporate 
information empowers citizens in their dealings with corporations.  
Yet, courts often continue to give deference to corporations’ decision 
to deny access to information, unless the requestor can demonstrate a 
material need for such information in order to protect a right that 
would otherwise be difficult to defend, and that the interest for access 
outweighs interest of the corporation for nondisclosure.  
 
Most FOI laws around the world have been enacted over that 
past twenty years,154 yet little attention has been given to the question 
of corporate information.  Still, a slowly accelerating trend can be 
identified where more recent FOI laws recognize some partial aspects 
of the right to access corporate information.155   
VI.  FROM THE EXISTING TO THE PROPOSED 
 
This article has thus far presented a variety of existing 
arrangements for receiving some information from corporations.  
 
 154. These information laws have been acted at a time when many of the legislating 
countries were undergoing an accelerated process of privatization (especially in the Eastern 
European countries), and when there was a heightened awareness of the growing power of 
corporations. 
 155. E.g., The New Zealand FOIA of 1982 is one of the oldest FOI laws, and yet it 
established a rather broad approach to the disclosure of information possessed by private 
corporations, even in comparison to the more recent legislation of other countries.  Official 
Information Act 1982 (N.Z.).  The legislation applies to information possessed by a contractor 
that is performing work for a public authority, on condition that the information came into his 
possession in relation to the work that is being performed for the authority.  Id. at art. 2(5).   
  The Irish FOIA uses a similar approach.  The Freedom of Information Act 1997 (Act 
No. 13/1997) (Ir.) § 6(9). 
  The Dutch FOIA establishes in section 3(1) that any person has the right to receive 
information from a corporation performing work for an executive authority, on the condition 
that the information exists in documents relating to an executive matter.  Government 
Information (Public Access) Act (1991). 
  A recent call for amending an FOI law to cover corporations was delivered in 
Bangladesh by the country’s Chief Information Commissioner, stating that: “Most of the 
corporate companies and giant financial institutions in the country remain out of the jurisdiction 
of the act. But people have the right to know about their activities and financial dealings.”  CIC 
Suggests Amending RTI Act for Transparency, THE DAILY STAR, July 21, 2010, 
www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/ news-details.php?nid=147630.  For more on the CIC’s views 
on the matter, see Bangladeshi Commissioner Supports Wider Coverage, FREEDOMINFO.ORG, 
Aug. 4, 2010, www.freedominfo.org/ 2010/08/bangladeshi-commissioner-supports-wider-
coverage. 
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This article will now examine why these mechanisms are insufficient if 
our wish is to enjoy the advantages of transparency as a tool to enable 
public oversight of corporations.  Next, the article will demonstrate 
how a “general disclosure duty” for corporations can be framed to 
meet the shortcoming of these other models, without severely 
harming legitimate corporate concerns. 
   
A.   WHAT IS PROPOSED? 
 
This article proposes a model that imposes a legal duty on 
corporation for “general disclosure” of information.  Similarly to 
existing Freedom of Information Laws, the model creates a 
presumption of openness that is rebuttable only if the request falls 
under certain procedural categories, or if the information is one that 
falls under certain exemptions.  Unlike existing FOI laws, however, 
additional substantial or procedural exceptions may be needed to 
protect legitimate corporate interests. 
The model is not far-reaching once certain reasonable limitations 
are established.  As we know it, FOIA includes a long list of 
exemptions.  Such exemptions will clearly apply to private 
corporations as well.  For instance “trade secrets”156 will remain 
exempt from disclosure, meeting many of the legitimate fears that 
may arise from a general disclosure regime.157 
 
B.   WHY EXISTING MODELS FALL SHORT 
 
1.  Specified Disclosure Obligations 
 
One method of imposing a legal duty of disclosure is to specify 
certain fields that would be subject to disclosure obligations, such as 
finance, consumerism and the environment.  Experience 
demonstrates that legislators in democratic countries are attentive to 
the promotion of transparency, and thus there is a high likelihood 
that significant progress could be accomplished in this way.  However, 
this model suffers from the following disadvantages: 
A biased list of disclosure: Imposing disclosure in any one field 
requires robust lobbying efforts that include effective public relations 
 
 156. FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
 157. On the other hand, other exemptions that clearly conflict the proposed model will have 
to be omitted, for instance “financial information obtained from a person.”  Id. 
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campaigns and the involvement of influential individuals or by 
garnering enough political will.  Finance, consumer affairs, and the  
environment, classic examples of the specified disclosure model, have 
benefitted from strong lobbying efforts.  The environment movement, 
for example benefitted from powerful public relations being 
supported by celebrities and environmental activists in wealthy 
countries.  Other areas that do not have the same support to lobby for 
their causes, such as the protection of worker rights158 and minorities 
against corporations,159 face a steep uphill battle.  Imposing a general 
obligation of disclosure would allow the weaker players to demand 
and receive the information that they need, regardless of the other 
strengths of their campaign. 
Delayed disclosure: In many situations, disclosure laws come 
only after the public incurs significant harm.  Food labeling 
requirements, for example, came only after the public had become 
more aware of manufacturers' manipulations of products.160  Financial 
disclosure laws followed the financial crisis of 1929 and the Enron and 
Worldcom affairs.  Disclosure requirement for pollutant emissions 
followed the deaths of thousands in Bhopal, India, from the release of 
methyl isocyanate into the air from a nearby factory.161  Access to 
corporate information might have led to the exposure of priceless 
information at a much earlier stage that could have prevented harm. 
Limited Disclosure: While specific disclosure requirements have 
led to the exposure of vast amounts of information from private 
corporations, the amount of information of public importance held in 
the corporate hands is so vast that no legislator can view the 
information picture in its entirety to decide what should be exposed 
and what would be of interest in the future.  “Much important data 
 
 158. In the mid-1980s there was an attempt in the European Commission to enact a directive 
that would impose a duty on any employer of a thousand or more employees to share with them 
information on a series of matters.  The proposal known as the “Vredeling Directive” (named 
after the Commission’s Dutch Labor commissioner Henk Vredeling) was defeated by pressure 
of large employers in Europe, and even employers from the U.S. who invested large sums of 
money in lobbying against it.  See generally LABOR AND AN INTEGRATED EUROPE (Llyod 
Ulman, Barry Eichengreen & William T. Dickens eds. 1993). 
 159. For example, in South Africa, in the case of Pretorius v. Nedcor Bank an individual 
whose bank refused to grant a loan petitioned to receive information from the bank regarding 
its risk assessment criteria regarding loan requestors.  The case dealt with the highly sensitive 
issue of racially or geographically based customer discrimination.  See Richard Calland, Prizing 
Open the Profit Making World, in THE TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 232 (Ann 
Florini ed. 2007). 
 160. Ilyse D. Barkan, Industry Invites Regulation: The Passage of the Pure Food and Drug 
Act of 1906, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18, 20 (1985).   
 161. Christine Overdevest & Brian Mayer, Harnessing the Power of Information for the Next 
Generation of Environmental Law: I. Collection and Construction of Information: Harnessing 
the Power of Information Through Community Monitoring: Insights from Social Science, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 1493, 1508 (2008). 
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simply cannot be expressed in a form suitable for standardized 
disclosure.”162  Thus, only a general rule of disclosure would enable 
individuals and independent groups to navigate this ocean of 
information in search of items that, to their best judgment, are 
publicly important. 
Disclosing in Conflict of Interest: In the current disclosure 
model, corporations are given too much discretion in how they 
present their information to the public.  Even if they carry out their 
legal duties in good faith,  corporations may have conflicts of interest 
that cause them to edit the disclosed information.  A general 
disclosure system would allow access to the corporation’s raw 
information, without mediation beyond the technical function of 
delivering the document. 
 
2.   Disclosure by Regulators 
 
As the public’s trustee, regulators should collect and disclose 
information from corporations they deem appropriate to protect the 
public’s interest while balancing the interests of corporations for 
nondisclosure.  But such a model suffers from at least three 
disadvantages.  First, the model suffers from similar biases problems 
as described in the “Specified Obligation Disclosure” model as only 
those issues that gain sufficient political will be subject to disclosure.  
Second, the regulators’ ability to examine information collected is 
limited by the resources at their disposal.  Thus, a general disclosure 
obligation that utilizes the full extent of the power of the public would 
result in a better and more efficient use of the information held by the 
regulator.163 
Another problem with this model is the lack of supervision.  In 
the absence of access to raw information, the public is unable to 
ascertain whether the regulator has made the full information 
available, and whether she acted properly with the information 
 
 162. RUSSEL STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION 13 (1980) 
 163. An example of the utilization of public power in the public sphere is the “MPs expenses 
scandal” in the U.K.  In the course of this scandal, hundreds of thousands of expense claims 
filed by MPs for items ranging from dog food to chimney sweeping at private homes.  The 
information was released following a five-year legal debate and caused a scandal that brought 
about the resignation of the house speaker, five cabinet ministers and several MPs.  Once the 
information was published, first in the Daily Telegraph to which it was leaked before its official 
release, and later in other newspapers, the public at large was asked to review the millions of 
documents to help the press identify items of interest (in what is known to internet savvies as 
“cloudsourcing”).  For an overview of the scandal, see MPs Expenses, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2010; 
for the cloudsourcing operation launched by “the Guardian” newspaper, see Investigate Your 
MPs Expenses, THE GUARDIAN, http://mps-expenses.guardian.co.uk (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) 
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available to her.  Even qualified regulators will occasionally make 
mistakes.  A report prepared for the U.S. Congress in 1990 showed 
that of 198 drugs that were approved by the FDA in 1976-1985, no 
less than 102 that were later found to be significantly dangerous.164  
Thus, some of these mistakes could have been prevented if 
individuals and consumer protection groups were given access to 
inspect the information. 
Another problem relates to the connection between the 
regulator and the corporations.  Regulators engage in daily working 
relationships with their regulated corporations.  Some may have been 
previous employees of these companies or wish to become one in the 
future.  Even assuming such a problem does not exist, the regulator 
needs the corporation’s cooperation.  Thus, regulators are likely to 
identify with corporate concerns rather than those of the public they 
represent.165 
 
3.  Disclosure through Discovery of Documents in Legal Proceedings 
 
A great deal of information is discovered during the discovery 
process of legal proceedings.  While expanding the scope of existing 
disclosure obligations in legal proceedings may be a viable option, 
such a model is neither efficient nor just.  The model is inefficient 
because the requestor must go through a number of unnecessary 
hearings and lengthy depositions to gain access to such information.  
The model is unjust because those unable to devote time or lack 
financial resources will likely be forced to abandon their case.  If 
individuals could manage to get the information without needing a 
court order, they could more reliably assess their chances in court, 
and would not be forced to abandon their case.  This would serve to 
promote the general interest of the public to discover the truth and 
the private interests of individual plaintiffs. 
 
 
 164. The report is discussed in the minority opinion in Int’l Dairy Foods. 
 165. This phenomenon is known as “Regulatory Capture.”   See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective 
Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1954); see 
generally Toni Makkai & John Braithwhaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense 
of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61 (1992). 
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C.  POSSIBLE MODELS FOR RECOGNITION OF FREEDOM OF 
CORPORATE  INFORMATION 
 
1.   Applying the Act to Corporations Enjoying Taxpayer Funding 
 
Corporation that derive a certain minimum percent of income 
from taxpayer money would be considered "public authorities" for 
the purposes of the act. Taxpayer dollars includes money received in 
government grants, contracts, etc., regardless of the formal mode of 
transaction.   More recent FOI laws adopt such a model. 
The upside to this model is that it significantly widens the 
application of the Act to private organizations.  The downside, 
however, is that the basis for distinguishing between those 
corporations that enjoy government funding and those that do not is 
problematic.  The model presupposes that because taxpayers fund 
these companies via the government, some property arises and 
attaches to the information.  This model addresses only the 
proprietary justification for disclosure, which is not necessarily the 
most compelling.  I have shown that there are other justifications that 
would apply to corporations who do not enjoy public funds, and those 
would not be covered by this model. Furthermore, this model would 
create some uncertainty by raising such questions as to whether 
government grants the same as government payments for services. 
 
2.  Applying the Act to Organizations Fulfilling a Public Service 
 
FOIA would apply to any organization “fulfilling a public 
service.”  Regulators may choose to define classes of activities an 
organization must operate to be considered “fulfilling a public 
service,” which may include but not limited to activities in education, 
health, communications, environment, and infrastructure.  While the 
more modern FIO laws have adopted this model, those countries 
constitute a minority of the world’s ninety FOI laws. 
The prominent advantage of this model is that it significantly 
expands a large number of corporations subject to the proposed act 
that are deemed fulfilling a public service.  But as discussed 
throughout this article, many corporations in purely commercial and 
non-public fields may also be of interest to the public, mainly due to 
the enormous power they amass.  Thus, an energy or infrastructure 
would both be subject to disclosure obligations, for example, where 
there is a public interest in ensuring equality to employees and 
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consumers, and where relating to a chain of coffee shops which 
apparently would not be subject to the provisions of the act. 
 
3.   Applying the Act to Information of Public Nature 
 
Organizations subject to FOIA are determined by the content of 
the information necessary for the exercise or protection of human 
rights, and not the organizations’ statutory status.  This model 
borrows from South Africa PAIA’s framework.  The advantage of 
this model is that, if interpreted broadly, it grants the public rights to 
access almost any piece of information. There is, however, negligible 
difference between this model and the general disclosure described 
below.  The disadvantage of this model is that it is subject to narrow 
judicial interpretation, as seen in the South African case,166 even when 
the language may not call for it.  Also, the model presupposes that 
absent a positive justification, the default position is nondisclosure. 
This model also has three procedural problems.  First, the 
requestor often does not know if the requested information is 
necessary for the protection of his rights.  For example, a member of 
a minority group requesting to access a company's hiring guidelines to 
determine whether it practices racially discriminatory practices could 
mislead the requestor by disclosing that its hiring guidelines do not 
refer to any protected class when the guidelines do indeed require 
prospective employees is a native speaker of the nation’s language.  
Second, the requestor bears the burden to show that the information 
in question has a bearing on the requestor’s rights.  The presumption 
should be for disclosure unless the corporation can show a valid and 
strong argument against disclosure, as the corporation is in a better 
position to do so.  Third, requiring the requestor to bear the burden 
of proof gives corporations the ability to put up legal hurdles that 
would make it bureaucratically complex and burdensome for the 
requestors and thus effectively deterring future disclosure inquires.  
 
D. GENERAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION 
 
 A key feature of the U.S. and other FOI laws is that public 
authorities are required to respond to any request,167 irrespective of 
 
 166. See section VI.D; see generally Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr. et al. v. African Nat’l Cong. 
et. al., 2005 (5) SA 39 (C). 
 167. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (1966). 
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the requestor’s motive.168  Unlike these FOI laws, however, a general 
disclosure model for corporations recognizes that there are occasions 
when the corporation has “legitimate interest” in refusing to disclose 
the requested information.  A corporation refusing an information 
request must show why such request serves an “illegitimate interest” 
or no interest at all.  The law should make clear that the threshold for 
disclosure is low, such that only those frivolous requests are 
dismissed.  Illegitimate requests are ones that mainly serve the 
financial interest of another person or corporation because 
compelling corporations to reveal information that serves no other 
purpose but the financial interest of another would be unreasonable 
and unfair.  Disclosure should not be used as a tool for companies to 
compete with one another in the marketplace.  In applying this type 
of disclosure requirement to corporations, legislators could simply 
add a section to the U.S. FOIA that states that the provisions of the 
FOIA also apply to commercial corporations, with exceptions 
tailored to corporations listed in a separate clause.   
  
1.   Advantages  
 
The first advantage of this model is that it subjects all profit-
oriented organizations, with prescribed exceptions listed in 
regulations, to disclosure requirements.169  To encourage the idea that 
access to information is a right, the requestors do not need to 
examine the nature of the organization (e.g., the organization’s 
operations and activities), or the sources of its funding, reducing the 
requestors’ need to expend extraneous resources to investigate 
organization nor legal fees to ascertain whether he has such a right to 
request information.   
Second, because this model creates a presumptive right for the 
requestors’ access to corporate information, social change 
organizations, which are the entities likely to make information 
disclosure requests, would be more encouraged to avail themselves to 
the right.  Relatedly, corporations bears the burden of proving that 
they meet one of the prescribed exceptions of the legislation and thus 
 
 168. As is clearly stated in several FOI laws, including: Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(Cth) s 11(2) (Austl.); The Freedom of Information Act 1997 (Act No. 13/1997) (Ir.) § 8(4); 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000  § 11(3) (S. Afr.); Freedom of Information 
Law, 5758-1998 (Isr.) § 7(a). 
 169. The regulations may, for instance, exempt small organizations such as those employing 
less than a certain number of employees, or with annual income that is lower than a set 
threshold. 
PELED_JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  2/4/2013  1:15 PM 
300 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 9:2 
bear the costs of making a defense, as opposed to the requestors, who 
are often the ones with less resources to carry such a burden.   
Finally, the model applies generally to the type of information 
that can be requested since there would not be a pre-determined 
limitation on the content that can be requested.  This means that 
there is less room for legal disputes and delay tactics even before a 
request is considered on its merits.  It also means less room for 
corporations to manipulate the characterization of information.  This 
will teach corporations to no longer rely on legal tactics to avoid 
disclosure and instead take the measures to adjust their organizations 
to be more transparent.   
 
2.   Disadvantages  
 
While the broad scope of this model yield the aforementioned 
advantages, it also produces some distinct disadvantages.  First, it 
would be unjustifiable, for instance, to impose the same disclosure 
obligation on a local grocery store as to a retail chain due to the 
different degrees of influence they have on matters of public 
concerns.  While a local grocery store may have an interest in such 
local matters as where to locate waste facilities in a city, corporations 
hold much more influence over public matters at large. Also, small 
businesses generally lack the resources to comply with information 
requests.  To rectify this problem, organizations of a certain size, as 
measured by some combinations of number of employees or assets, 
should be exempt from the general disclosure obligation.  While this 
may cause some uncertainties, these cases would exist on the margins 
because smaller organizations are rarely the kind of organizations 
that hold information that could have a significant impact on society 
as larger corporations.  
The second disadvantage of the general disclosure obligation is 
the danger of forcing corporations to disclose information to any 
requestors, including those seeking information to harm the company, 
those engaging in commercial espionage, or those who have other 
inappropriate motives.  A possible solution to this problem is to 
institute an identification requirement for information seekers.  This 
identification requirement would enable the private corporations, in 
good faith, to carefully weigh to whom the information is disclosed. 
Where disclosure would triggers security or industrial espionage 
concerns, legislators could easily include these scenarios to the 
disclosure exemption list; these types of exemptions already exist in 
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most FOI laws.170  Additionally, to curtail those from engaging in 
“obsessive” requests,171 corporations should be allowed to dismiss 
frivolous or vexatious requests outright.  To prevent corporations 
from abusing this right, include language in the statute to clarify that 
the ability to dismiss frivolous requests only applies to unusual 
situations. 
The final disadvantage of this model is compliance costs.172  As a 
solution, there can be a general rule that the requestors bear the costs 
of the inquiry and where corporations are required to disclose only 
the information readily available.  This rule would be more forgiving 
than the current FOIA that requires public authorities to conduct 
extensive search and retrieval operation.173 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Just as the right to freedom of information redistributed power 
between the government and its citizenry, it should now redistribute 
power between corporations and individuals to protect the public 
interest by ensuring the proper conduct of corporate activity.  This 
article has argued that corporations do not have an inherent right to 
deny individuals access to information.  Imposing a general duty to 
disclose on corporations requires a revolution of thought.  Corporate 
employees must become accustomed to the idea that they may need 
to explain to the public, under certain circumstances, their actions.  
Corporations will need to be more upfront and honest.  The public, 
and especially journalists and civil society organizations, must be 
educated to ask for meaningful information that could improve 
society and advance the defense of civil liberties.  Legislators may 
need to establish proper mechanisms to ensure corporate compliance 
while avoiding placing too much burden on them. Courts will need to 
be active in clarifying the legal standard.  Challenging as the task may 
be, the result will be a significant contribution to the protection of the 
public interests. 
 
 170. See e.g., exemption 4 of FOIA that covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 
 171. Indeed some FOI laws try to deal with this problem.  Section 14(1) to the U.K. FOIA 
(supra note 34) allows a public authority not to comply with a request on the grounds that it is 
“vexatious.”  The British Information Commission has issued guidelines on when a request is to 
be viewed as vexatious: ICO, www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/ library/
freedom_of_information/ practical_application/vexatious_requests_a_short_guide.pdf. 
 172. For an estimate of the annual cost of FOI in several countries, see The Best Things in 
Life are Free: How Much Does FOI Cost?, CONST. UNIT BLOG, Apr. 11, 2010, 
www.constitution-unit.com/2011/04/11/the-best-things-in-life-are-free-how-much-does-foi-cost. 
 173. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C) (1966). 
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